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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of natural disasters on price stability in the
euro area. We estimate panel and country-specific structural vector autoregression
(VAR) models by combining estimated damages of disaster events with monthly
data for the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for all euro area coun-
tries over the period 1996-2021. Besides estimating the effect on overall headline
inflation, we examine effects on its 12 main sub-indices and further sub-categories
of food price inflation. This allows us to disentangle differences in the direction
and strength of price effects across consumption categories. Our results suggest
significant positive effects of natural disasters on overall headline inflation, with di-
verging results at the sub-index level. Positive inflation effects are particularly pro-
nounced for prices of food and beverages, while negative effects prevail for other
sub-indices. Our country-specific results suggest heterogenous inflation effects of
natural disasters across different countries. A key implication of our findings is that
climate change is likely to make it increasingly difficult for the European Central
bank to achieve its inflation target.
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1 Introduction
“I want to explore every avenue available in order to combat climate change. This is
something that I hold very strongly and I believe that, as we have this price stability
mandate [...], climate change actually has an impact on price stability. If we fail to
measure externalities, if we fail to anticipate drought, if we fail to anticipate variations
of prices of food, of energy, of services, then we are not doing our job.”
Christine Lagarde, Interview with the Financial Times, July 7, 2020.
The European Central Bank (ECB) has recently decided to incorporate climate change
into its operations and decision making processes (ECB, 2021a, 2021b). Yet, so far little
is known on whether climate change affects price stability in the euro area – the ECB’s
primary objective. On the one hand, climate change is associated with an increase in
the frequency and severity of natural disasters (IPCC, 2021; Stott, 2016; Simola, 2020).
Evidently, natural disasters can affect the economy by destroying infrastructure, houses
and harvests as well as disrupting supply chains. On the other hand, to date, there is
no empirical evidence that natural disasters influence the price level significantly in the
euro area. This is an important knowledge gap: understanding the impact of natural dis-
asters on inflation is essential for the design of monetary policy in the era of the climate
crisis. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap.
Our analysis relies on a panel structural VAR approach. We use the Harmonised Index
of Consumer Prices (HICP), which is the target variable of the ECB’s primary objec-
tive of maintaining price stability. This allows our results to be of direct relevance to
the ECB’s monetary policy. We employ monthly data to capture the immediate price
responses following natural disasters. To disentangle potentially contrasting price ef-
fects across product categories, that might offset each other at the aggregate level, we
disaggregate the overall HICP inflation into its main 12 sub-indices. Our results suggest
that natural disasters have a statistically significant effect on overall headline inflation,
with diverging results at the sub-index level. Positive inflation effects are particularly
pronounced for prices of food and beverages, while negative effects prevail for other
sub-indices. The results also suggest heterogeneous effects of natural disasters across
countries.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the
potential impacts of disasters on inflation and reviews the relevant empirical litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the data that are used throughout the analysis. The empirical
methodology is outlined in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section
6 concludes.
2 Background and literature review
From a theoretical point of view, natural disasters can have both positive and negative
effects on inflation. On the one hand, natural disasters might create positive inflation-
ary pressures since they may destroy crops, buildings and infrastructure and thereby
cause negative supply-side shocks (Batten et al., 2020; Simola, 2020). These shocks
can increase the costs of domestic producers and can create spill-over effects to foreign
importers. Furthermore, transportation costs might rise due to damaged infrastructure or
the need to import the goods from abroad, again causing upward pressures on prices and
creating spill-overs across countries (Klomp and Sseruyange, 2021). From the demand-
side, natural disasters often spur reconstruction efforts, which may cause a temporary
local boom in the prices of reconstruction goods.
On the other hand, inflation can also go down in the aftermath of a natural disaster. For
example, the destruction of houses and physical capital of firms can diminish wealth,
leading to reduced consumption and firm investment. This holds true even if house-
holds and firms are insured against losses from disasters: first, the cost of insurance can
prevent additional consumption and investment; second, if weather shocks occur more
often and more strongly due to climate change, the insurance costs will likely increase.
Moreover, higher loan defaults in the aftermath of a natural disaster can cause a decline
in the credit provision by banks, reinforcing the decline in consumption and investment.
Empirical research has shown, for example, that climate vulnerability influences the
availability and cost of corporate capital (Kling et al., 2021).
With the coexistence of upward and downward pressures on prices, the exact inflation
effects in the aftermath of natural disasters cannot be determined a priori. In addition,
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it might turn out that consumer prices of some goods fall, while prices of other items
increase.
Although a wide range of macroeconomic models have explored the effects of climate
change on the macroeconomy under different global warming scenarios (e.g. Dietz and
Stern, 2015; Nordhaus, 2018; Dafermos et al., 2018; NGFS, 2021), the historical effects
of climate change on inflation and other macroeconomic variables have so far received
relatively little attention. This is partially explained by the fact that in the case of cli-
mate change the past cannot be a good guide for the future: the non-linearities associated
with global warming imply that the climate-economy relationships might fundamentally
change in the future, especially if atmospheric temperature passes specific thresholds.
However, given that atmospheric temperature has substantially increased over the last
decades, exploring how climate change has already affected the macroeconomic system
can provide useful insights from a policy making perspective.
So far, the econometric literature on the macroeconomic effects of climate change has
primarily focused on the impact of atmospheric temperature and disasters on economic
growth and productivity (see Botzen et al. (2019) and Kalkhul and Wenz (2020) and
the references therein). There are also several studies that have investigated the effects
of disasters on trade.1 Less attention has been paid to the impact of temperature and
natural disasters on other macroeconomic variables.
A few recent econometric studies have investigated the impact of natural disasters or
temperature shocks on inflation. Parker (2018) has explored the effects of natural dis-
asters on inflation in a panel of 212 countries over the period 1980-2012. He has found
that while the impact of natural disasters on inflation in developed countries is negli-
gible, natural disasters have persistent effects on inflation in developing countries. His
results also suggest that there are differences in the inflation impact by type of disaster
and inflation sub-index. Heinen et al. (2019) have documented a positive impact of hur-
ricanes and floods on inflation using a sample of 15 Caribbean countries. In contrast,
Cavallo et al. (2013) have found no significant effect on prices in the aftermath of the
1See, for example, Gassebner et al. (2010), Oh and Reuveny (2010), Felbermayr and Gröschl (2013),
El Hadri et al. (2019), and Osberghaus (2019).
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2010 Chile and 2011 Japan earthquakes. Moreover, Doyle and Noy (2015) have found
that prices declined following the Canterbury earthquake in 2010 due to the decline in
aggregate demand.
A couple of studies have explored the inflationary effects of temperature shocks. Faccia
et al. (2020) have analysed the impact of country-specific summer temperature anoma-
lies on inflation for 34 advanced economies and 15 emerging and developing economies
over the period 1980-2018. They have found that very hot summers have medium-run
negative effects on inflation. Using a sample of both developed and developing coun-
tries, Mukherjee and Ouatarra (2021) have documented positive effects of temperature
shocks on inflation, with these effects being persistent for developing countries.
To date, a detailed analysis of the effects of disasters on inflation in the euro zone is still
lacking. Our paper aims to close this gap by econometrically estimating the effects of
natural disasters on inflation in the euro area during the period 1996-2021.
3 Data
Our sample includes monthly observations from 1996:01 to 2021:03 for the 19 euro
area countries. To measure monthly inflation rates, we use data on headline inflation
and its sub-indices.2 Data are taken from Eurostat and capture the price changes of
consumer goods and services acquired by euro area households. Unlike other consumer
price data, they are based on harmonised statistical methods and thus allow for cross-
country comparisons. Data are available for overall headline inflation, as well as for its
12 main sub-indices and further sub-categories. This allows to disentangle differences
in the direction and strength of price effects across consumption categories.
To capture the impact of natural disasters, we draw on the EM-DAT database from
the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the Université
Catholique de Louvain. This extensive database comprises detailed data on natural dis-
asters, such as storms, floods, droughts, heat and cold waves, earthquakes, and volcanic
2For details on the classification of the individual sub-indices, see: https://appsso.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=prc_hicp_midx&lang=en.
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eruptions, which occurred worldwide since 1900 up to the present.3 It also contains
information on the strength of the disaster, as well as on the number of people killed
and affected, and the estimated monetary damage. The EM-DAT data are compiled
from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organisations, insur-
ance companies, research institutes and press agencies.
We follow the literature on the macroeconomic effects of natural disasters (Noy, 2009;
Noy and Nualsri, 2011; Parker, 2018 and Fratzscher et al., 2020) and use the reported
estimated damage as our disaster variable. This measure captures the direct damage
to crops, property and livestock, measured in US dollars and valued at the moment of
the event. As the effects of the disasters on inflation depend on the size of the disaster
and to standardise across countries, we follow Fratzscher et al. (2020) and divide the
estimated damage by the level of monthly current-price GDP in the affected country, 12
months prior to the event. In consequence, our disaster variable captures the estimated
monetary damage of the event in percent of GDP.
We add numerous control variables to our model to account for other driving forces
of inflation rates. We extract monthly data on the gross domestic product (GDP, ra-
tio to trend), industrial production (excluding construction) and the unemployment rate
for all euro area countries as well as on the nominal exchange rate to US dollars from the
OECD’s Main Economic Indicators and Key Short-Term Economic Indicators databases.
Data on industrial import prices are drawn from Eurostat, brent crude oil prices are ex-
tracted from the World Bank Commodity Price Data.
3We are aware of the fact that earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are not directly related to climate
change, but rather result from tectonic processes. However, recent research indicates that climate change
may, in the very long run, contribute to an increase in these processes. This, in turn, may induce earth-
quakes and volcanic eruptions to increase (Masih, 2018; Carrivick et al., 2018). Moreover, excluding
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions from the analysis does not significantly alter our results, as they make




A panel structural VAR (PSVAR) is used to examine the response of headline inflation
and its sub-indices for a panel of 19 euro area countries to shocks imposed on our
disaster variable. The analysis also controls for the domestic drivers of inflation outlined
in Section 3. This approach enables a determination to be made of the dynamics and
duration of the effect of disasters on inflation. The PSVAR can be denoted as follows in
its general specification, with structural shocks identified by a recursive restriction:
Yi,t = A(L)Yi,t−1 + αi + µi,t (1)
where Yi,t refers to a vector of our selected endogenous variables of country i; A(L) is
a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator L; αi denotes country-specific fixed effects
to account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across countries; and µi,t is a
vector of disturbances. Note that the exogenous nature of the disaster variable allows us
to employ a recursive identification scheme.
Due to the autoregressive nature of the PSVAR, fixed effects are intrinsically correlated
with the regressors. Hence, we use the forward orthogonal deviation procedure pro-
posed by Arellano and Bover (1995) to eliminate fixed effects, such that the transformed
variables are orthogonal to the lagged regressors. The PSVAR incorporates three lags,
which is selected using the Akaike information criterion. Apart from the PSVAR model,
we also estimate country-specific SVARs for the 4 largest euro area countries, namely
France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The set-up is in line with equation (1), adjusted for
the country-specific case. Following Christiano et al. (1999), the identification strategy




a1,1 0 · · · 0
a2,1 a2,2 · · · 0
...
... . . .
...
am,1 am,2 · · · am,n
 (2)
The ordering of the variables imposed in the recursive form implies that the variables at
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the top (such as a1,1) will not be affected by the contemporaneous shocks to the lower
variables (such as am,1) while the lower variables will be affected by the contemporane-
ous shocks to the upper variables. We then place our disaster variable at the top in the
ordering, which implies that it will only be affected by a contemporaneous shock to it-
self. Following the disaster variable, we place industrial production, the unemployment
rate, and the monthly changes in the US dollar nominal exchange rate, import prices and
oil prices next in the ordering. This implies that these domestic factors will be affected
by contemporaneous shocks to natural disasters and themselves, but not by contempo-
raneous shocks to inflation. Importantly, we place inflation last in the ordering, which
is not only based on the assumption that natural disasters will affect inflation, but also
on the consideration that domestic macroeconomic factors also matter for inflation.
5 Results
5.1 Panel results
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of euro area headline and core inflation to natural
disaster shocks, together with 95% confidence intervals generated by Monte-Carlo with
500 repetitions. The scale of the disaster shock is normalised as one percentage point
of monthly GDP. We find that headline inflation in the euro area significantly increases
by 0.1 percentage points right after the disasters take place. The magnitude of the ef-
fects declines over the subsequent 2 months, at which point the impulse response also
become insignificant, before dissipating from about 6 months onwards. For euro area
core inflation, a similar pattern to headline inflation emerges, albeit at somewhat lower
magnitudes. Overall, however, while it appears that euro area inflation responds sig-
nificantly and positively to disaster shocks during the first month, these effects are not
very substantial in size. Moreover, the effects are not long-lasting, as expected and also
reflecting the literature.
[Figure 1 about here]
Given that the average inflation responses may mask different or even opposing ef-
fects taking place on sub-components of inflation, across different euro area countries,
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or both, we also perform the impulse response analysis at a more disaggregated level.
Figure 2 shows substantial heterogeneity in the impulse response functions. Indeed,
the prices of food, clothing, housing, electricity, household equipment, health, educa-
tion, restaurants, and miscellaneous goods significantly increase after the disasters take
place. On the contrary, the prices of transport and communication decrease instanta-
neously following disasters. For other categories, we find no significant effects. In
line with the results for headline and core euro area inflation, the responses of the sub-
indices of inflation to disaster shocks generally become insignificant after 2 months,
with the effects converging to zero from around 6 months onwards. Figure 3 zooms
in on the sub-categories of food and beverage inflation. Increases in food inflation are
significantly driven by the price of bread and cereals, meat, fish, milk and eggs, sugar,
and food products n.e.c.. On the other hand, we only find ambiguous effects in other
categories.
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
Overall, the panel results indicate that natural disasters affect the euro area headline
inflation, as well as some of its sub-indices. While upward pressures are particularly
strong for food and beverages, downward pressures prevail in other categories. The
coexistence of upward and downward pressures for different product groups reveals the
importance of distinguishing between product categories, that might be obfuscated at
the aggregate level.
5.2 Country-specific results
We now turn to discuss the results from a series of country-specific structural VAR
models for 4 large euro area economies: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. These four
countries have been selected because they are the largest economies in the euro area
and thereby have a significant effect on the monetary policy decisions of the ECB. The
country-specific analysis enables us to determine whether the results for euro area infla-
tion are concealing heterogeneity at the country level.
For France (Figure 4), headline inflation increases instantaneously as the disaster shock
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takes place, although the impulse response is not statistically significant, before decreas-
ing significantly at around four months after the shock. The pattern is similar for core
inflation, with much lower magnitudes. In the case of Germany (Figure 5), headline
inflation decreases significantly around 3 months after the disaster shock, with the ef-
fect disappearing and becoming insignificant from around 6 months onwards. On core
inflation in Germany, no significant responses to disaster shocks are found. For Italy
(Figure 6), headline inflation responds significantly downwards at around 2 months af-
ter the disaster shock. It then rebounds positively 4-5 months after the shock, with the
magnitude dissipating gradually thereafter, converging to zero and not significant from
6 months onwards. A similar reaction can be found in the case of core inflation in Italy.
In the case of Spain (Figure 7), the response of headline inflation is negative and sig-
nificant to a disaster shock at the point of initial impact, before increasing at around 3
months. The impulse response is largely insignificant otherwise. As emerged for the
other countries, the reaction of core inflation in Spain displays a very similar pattern
to that of headline inflation, with some differences in magnitudes. Overall, it is clear
that there are some opposing effects across the four largest euro area economies. While
there are both upward and downward inflation responses to disaster shocks evident, the
aggregated significant responses during the first 6 months after the shock, positive in-
flation responses in Italy and Spain outweigh negative inflation responses in France and
Germany.
[Figures 4-7 about here]
We also examine sub-categories of inflation responses to disaster shocks at the national
level in France, Germany, Italy and Spain (see Figures A1 to A8 in the Appendix). For
France, positive and significant responses in food and beverages, as well as clothing
categories, emerge after around 3 months (Figure A1). In Figure A2, the response of
inflation in food and beverages in France are driven by positive impulse responses for
bread and cereals, coffee and tea, and soft drinks. These positive responses, however,
are largely outweighed by negative reactions in other sub-sectors, including transport,
communication and recreation. In the case of Germany, it is striking that the response of
food and beverages inflation is negative and significant at 3 and 4 months after the dis-
aster shock (Figure A3). This is the opposite of dynamics for the euro area as a whole.
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Negative and significant responses in transport and communications inflation are also
evident for Germany. The responses in inflation for fruit and vegetables appears to
drive the overall decreases in food and beverages inflation for Germany (Figure A4). In
Italy, food and beverages (and clothing) inflation response dynamics to a natural disas-
ter shock are similar to those of Germany, with a negative and significant response after
2 months (Figure A5). Food prices responses are strongly driven by price behaviour
in fruit and vegetables sub-categories, as well as coffee and tea (Figure A6). Negative
inflation responses in Italy in food and beverages, however, appear to be outweighed by
positive responses in transport, communication, and clothing sub-sectors. For Spain, we
also find a negative and significant reaction of food and beverages inflation to a disaster
shock after 3 months (Figure A7), with an important role for bread cereals and other
food products (Figure A8). This negative effect in Italy is dominated by positive infla-
tion responses in clothing and household equipment.
Overall, natural disaster shocks lead to different responses in inflation across different
sub-indices of inflation across euro area economies, with negative and positive effects
counteracting each other. This is not surprising: supply and demand factors, as well as
the sectoral composition of the economy, have a strong bearing on the nature of these
transmission channels and on which effect dominates.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature about the macroeconomic effects of natural disas-
ters. Using a structural VAR approach, we have estimated the effects of natural disasters
on headline inflation and its main sub-indices in the euro area over the period 1996-
2021. Our results suggest significantly positive effects of natural disasters on headline
inflation, with diverging results at the sub-index level. Positive inflation effects are par-
ticularly pronounced for prices of food and beverages, while negative effects prevail for
other sub-indices. In addition, country-specific impulse response functions aggregated
over a 6-month horizon indicate that the mainly positive significant inflation responses
in Italy and Spain outweigh the negative responses in Germany and France. Moreover,
as expected, no long-lasting effects of natural disasters shocks on inflation are found,
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with impulse response converging to zero and becoming insignificant from around 6
months after the disaster shock.
Our empirical results have several implications for the ECB’s monetary policy in the era
of the climate crisis. First, as global warming accelerates, climate-induced inflationary
pressures at the euro area are likely to increase. This will make it more challenging
for the ECB to achieve its inflation target in the future. Second, the divergent inflation
responses to natural disasters at the product level suggest heterogeneous inflation expe-
riences among households: households whose consumption basket consists of products
that are more likely to experience an increase in prices in the aftermath of natural dis-
asters will be more adversely affected compared to households whose consumption is
proportionately less reliant on such goods. This might call into question the rationale
of targeting an aggregate index of inflation. Third, the heterogeneity of the inflation ef-
fects of natural disasters among countries will make it increasingly difficult for the ECB
to align inflation rates across countries and satisfy the needs of all individual member
countries. Finally, given these effects of climate change on the ability of the ECB to
achieve its inflation target, the ECB needs to consider how it can use its monetary pol-
icy and prudential tools to contribute to the reduction of emissions.4 Contributing to an
alignment of financial markets with a net-zero pathway in order to prevent catastrophic
climate change is the best way for the ECB to mitigate climate-induced disruptions to
its ability to achieve price stability.
It is important to highlight that our analysis has only considered the physical impacts
of climate change on inflation, not transition impacts. As part of its European Green
Deal, the EU has committed to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 – a goal that has
been made legally binding by the European Climate Law. Climate policies to achieve
the decarbonisation of the EU economy, such as carbon pricing, are likely to affect
inflation and complicate monetary policy making (McKibbin et al., 2021). Moreover,
the transition to net-zero can be expected to cause large-scale structural changes in EU
member countries (Semieniuk et al., 2021), which may impact on both short- and long-
run inflation dynamics. Overall, it will be imperative for the ECB to carefully consider
the impacts of climate change on price stability and do whatever it takes to support a
4For several proposals in this direction, see e.g. Dafermos et al. (2021) and Dikau et al. (2021)
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smooth transition of the EU to a climate-neutral economy.
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Figures
Figure 1: Responses of headline and core inflation to disaster shocks
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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Figure 2: Responses of inflation sub-indices to disaster shocks
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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Figure 3: Responses of food and beverages inflation to disaster shocks
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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Figure 4: Responses of headline and core inflation to disaster shocks: France
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
Figure 5: Responses of headline and core inflation to disaster shocks: Germany
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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Figure 6: Responses of headline and core inflation to disaster shocks: Italy
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
Figure 7: Responses of headline and core inflation to disaster shocks: Spain
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of




Figure A1: Responses of inflation sub-indices to disaster shocks: France
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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Figure A2: Responses of food and beverage inflation to disaster shocks: France
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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Figure A3: Responses of inflation sub-indices to disaster shocks: Germany
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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Figure A4: Responses of food and beverage inflation to disaster shocks: Germany
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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Figure A5: Responses of inflation sub-indices to disaster shocks: Italy
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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Figure A6: Responses of food and beverage inflation to disaster shocks: Italy
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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Figure A7: Responses of inflation sub-indices to disaster shocks: Spain
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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Figure A8: Responses of food and beverage inflation to disaster shocks: Spain
Note: Impulse responses with 95% confidence bands in dashed lines are shown. The unit of
disaster shock is one percentage point of monthly GDP, and the unit of the horizon axes refers
to one month.
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